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CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During recent years, a number of legislative proposals concerning the 
granting of extraterritorial voting rights have been met with increasing acceptance 
by national legislatures and have become implemented with varying degrees of 
social recognition. At first glance, supporters of global justice and cosmopolitan 
democracy can only rejoice from the increasing presence in national electoral 
legislation of such statutes conceding rights of representation to non-residents. 
Upon closer inspection however, only some such legislation is indeed cosmopolitan 
in character. Many (and probably most) cases draw rather on ethnic, cultural and 
otherwise identitarian forms of justifications (such as extending to an ethnically 
related population representation rights in the “Fatherland”). Furthermore, such 
extension of voting rights on ethnic criteria may contribute to an amplification of 
the identitarian themes in electoral campaigns and is not foreign to the rise of 
xenophobic movements in several parts of Europe and elsewhere. In certain recent 
cases, the path towards violently redrawing borders to match the ethnic territorial 
distribution is very short. 
From a global justice or cosmopolitan democracy perspective2, the 
normative requirement for extending voting rights is rather based on conceptions of 
shared responsibility, universal community of fate, and the commitment to 
articulate the idea of a basic equal human dignity for all human beings. Membership 
in contemporary states is seen as not the exclusive or even primary source of 
political obligation and, as such, cosmopolitan mutual duties reaching across 
borders can give rise to new forms of legal and political configurations that may 
entail, for instance, the notion of voting rights based on constituencies defined 
beyond the basic framework of a nation-state. At the very least, ethnicity is not seen 
as particularly conducive to such a cosmopolitan agenda, since it rather contributes to 
                                                        
1
   This activity is part of the project CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY 
COSMOPOLITANISM supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for 
Scientific Research, CNCS - code: PN-II-RU-TE-2011–3-0218. 
2
  Gillian Brock, Harry Brighouse, The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005; Gillian Brock, Global Justice, Oxford 
University Press US, 2009. 
CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 2  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
re-emphasizing the very exclusionary borders and ethnic kinship priorities that 
cosmopolitans are keen to transgress or amend. 
For instance, should those who are the object of international development 
policies have a say in their design, instead of seeing them as a matter of discretion 
of the donors from the global North? If yes, what form could this inclusion take? 
Could they – or their representatives – be included as holders of political rights 
when such decisions are taken? In other words, given the fact that development 
policies are commonly framed as a North-South divide problem, with the North as 
shareholders and the South as stakeholders – isn’t there a (democratic) case to be 
made that the individuals targeted by such policies, which usually are precisely not 
citizens of the countries that finance them, should vote in the matters that affect 
them in very obvious ways? During the last decade, the case was repeatedly made 
that because decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan profoundly altered the lives 
of millions, and ultimately resulted in the death of hundreds to thousands, voting 
rights in the US elections should not be restricted to the current range of American 
citizens.  
More generally, decisions that have explicit or implicit extraterritorial 
implications are deemed to be in need of further democratic justification – to those 
that are affected by them. Building a nuclear plant, for instance, on a river bordering 
two countries is an explicit case – as the effects on both the river and on the larger 
environment and population in case of accident are not naturally delimited by 
borders. Claims by neighboring populations to be included into the decision 
procedures and possibly vote on them are aiming to replace the traditional 
boundaries of citizenship with other criteria allowing for regional, subsidiarity-
based judgments concerning the franchise of inclusion. Catastrophic accidents are 
usually invoked in such arguments, as they raise the normative stakes in the debates 
on political and personal autonomy. If we follow Ulrich Beck’s evolving account of 
the risk society3, however, the global range of even mundane decisions has become 
the norm. The implicit effects of such decisions are not immediately visible, yet 
nonetheless crucial. There are three “logics” of global risks: environmental crises, 
global financial risks, and terrorist threats4, but also a “cosmopolitan moment”:  
 
“Global risks force us to confront the apparently excluded other. They tear 
down national barriers and mix natives with foreigners. The expelled other becomes the 
internal other, as a result not of migration but of global risks. Everyday life become 
                                                        
3
  Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, 1 edition, Newbury Park, London, 
SAGE Publications Ltd, Calif., 1992; Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, Polity, London, 
1999; Ulrich Beck, World at Risk, Polity, London, 2009. 
4
  Ulrich Beck, World at Risk, cit., p. 13. 
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cosmopolitan: human beings must lend meaning to their lives through exchanges with 
others and no longer in encounters with people like themselves”5. 
 
This article examines the way in which the current debates on the 
“democracy’s boundary problem” determine the cosmopolitan answer to the 
question of extraterritorial voting rights. Succinctly put, in as much as the political 
borders of a demos are democratically arbitrary (since impossible to be decided 
democratically by the very demos created by such boundaries), a number of 
theorists has proposed that we apply, for instance, the “all-affected interests” 
principle6 in order to extend to all affected individuals the rights of political 
membership, including the right to vote. Such approaches are, I claim, less 
ambitious than some cosmopolitan theorists presume – yet they still engage our 
democratic imaginary in ways that are crucial. After discussing the different 
formulations of democracy’s boundary problem and their normative texture, I turn 
to the oft-mentioned claim for granting extraterritorial rights. Such a claim is based 
on the all affected interests principle – which can itself have multiple significations. 
It mandates the inclusion of those whose interests are affected, and I discuss in turn 
the possible interpretations of “affected interests” and then move toward the broader 
political theoretical discussion concerning the imperatives of political “inclusion”. I 
maintain that an exclusive territorial reading of the principle does not hold; also, 
that the electoral primacy of inclusion through the right to vote does not hold either. 
I conclude on a note concerning the normative potential of modular citizenship and 
virtual representation when articulated in a deliberative democratic key. 
 
 
DEMOCRACY’S BOUNDARY PROBLEM 
 
First articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and later taken up by Robert 
Dahl, Frederick Whelan and a growing number of theorists recently, the democratic 
boundary paradox opens a famously puzzling window on our democratic 
                                                        
5
  Ibidem, p. 15. 
6
  Gustaf Arrhenius, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory”, Democracy Unbound: 
Basic Explorations I, Filosofiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet, Stockholm, 2005, 
pp. 14-29; D. Miller, “Democracy’s Domain”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37, no. 3, 
2009, pp. 201-228; R.E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its 
Alternatives”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, 2007, pp. 40-68. 
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intuitions7. If we disregard the circumstances of the constitution of the democratic 
demos and we take it as granted, democratic theorizing is concerned with the 
various procedures, values, and institutions of a democratic regime – the 
overwhelming majority of democratic scholarship is of this sort. But as the authors 
above show, much of this literature rests on a silent paradox, that of the constitution 
of the demos itself. It is a paradox, or at least a testing problem, as it seems to 
involve a particularly challenging definitional circularity. It has been called “the 
problem of the unit”8, the “paradox of politics”9 or “the problem of constituting the 
demos”10 – and I use in the following pages several of these terms interchangeably.  
In a nutshell, are we entitled to simply presuppose the existence of a 
democratically legitimate demos? On what grounds were the rules of membership 
within the demos decided? Is it even possible for a demos to constitute itself 
democratically? Is it not the case that, in order to be constituted in a democratic 
fashion, the demos has to already exist?  
This circularity is troubling if we attempt to address it from within 
democratic theory. To be sure, on many other accounts, the problem can be easily 
dissipated. A nationalist approach to the composition of the demos can be perfectly 
comfortable with a set of criteria for inclusion and exclusion based on ethnicity. As 
mentioned above, in a significant number of contemporary cases this still is the 
framework of reference when thinking about the political boundaries of a 
democratic people. Recent referenda in Crimea or Scotland were densely disputed 
on legal grounds, but the ultimate ethnic criterion of delineating a new political 
community was not in itself condemned as totally groundless – if anything else, 
because most contemporary states were themselves established as nation-states, 
resulting from (however imperfect) efforts to draw geographical boundaries 
consistent with ethnic territorial presence. Accordingly, the ethnic criterion is still 
very much present in the contemporary political imaginary.  
But any such criterion would be democratically arbitrary. The problem 
arises when we examine the structure of democratic theory. With the exception of 
                                                        
7
  Robert Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, Conn., 1970; Idem, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, CT, 1989; Frederick Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary 
Problem”, Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy, vol. 25, 1983, pp. 13-47; Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Rousseau: “The Social Contract” and Other Later Political Writings, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
8
  Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, cit.. 
9
  Bonnie Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic 
Theory”, American Political Science Review, vol. 101, no. 1, February 2007, pp. 1-17. 
10
  R.E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests…cit.”. 
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Joseph Schumpeter’s understanding of democracy as a ‘method’ with little or no 
deeper normative implications11, most theories of democracy need to account for 
the democratic quality of the authorization mechanisms governing the constitution of 
the demos itself. Political membership is a question to be itself decided democratically. 
I have argued elsewhere12 that in fact there are two logically (and perhaps 
chronologically) distinct versions of the paradox of democratic inclusion. One 
version is relevant for the founding time of a political community: in such an 
inaugural moment, a demos is at the same time subject and object of the decision to 
establish a political community. The circularity is binary: the people as subject 
(shareholders) are the people as object (stakeholders) of the same act – hence a 
democratic self-institution paradox. In order for a demos to institute itself 
democratically, it has to already exist and operate with democratic procedures. The 
second version concerns the contemporary borders of a political community – and 
questions the democratic legitimacy of putative decisions to be taken only by the 
members, yet affecting in significant ways nonmembers. Here, the circularity is 
ternary: if in the previous case the decision itself was univocal (founding a demos) 
and fixed, now it can have any content – and hence all the three elements of the 
paradox can define the others: stakeholders, shareholders and the content of the 
decision. As we shall see below, in both versions of the paradox there are crucial 
concerns to be answered, with fundamental consequences for the political 
application of these issues.  
The present discussion looks mostly into the second version – and the 
specific problem of democratic externalities that are generated by it. In a sense, the 
question of political or geographical borders is crucial to political theory in general, 
not only to democratic theory. Yet democracy, again, presupposes a procedural 
consistency of a higher order than is the case in other theories. As such, it cannot 
avoid dealing with the conundrum of the mismatch between shareholders and 
stakeholders – as it goes to the very core of its notion of procedural legitimacy. The 
fact that a democratic people makes decisions that commonly affect others is both 
unavoidable and impermissible within democratic proceduralism, and as such a 
fundamentally immanent problem. As Abizadeh writes,  
 
“[T]he act of constituting boundaries circumscribing political rights is always an 
exercise of power over both insiders and outsiders that, by the very act, purports to disenfranchise 
                                                        
11
  Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Routledge, London, 
1942. 
12
  Camil Alexandru Pârvu, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Cosmopolitan 
Implications”, in Dan A. Lazea, Tamara Cărăuș (eds.), Cosmopolitanism Without 
Foundations, Zeta Books, București, 2014, pp. 89-110. 
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the outsiders over whom power is exercised […] It is this conceptual feature of 
boundaries that confronts democratic theory with an externality problem […] The power 
required to constitute political boundaries is intrinsically an outward – extending power”13. 
 
  
THE CASE FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL 
VOTING RIGHTS 
 
Can we say, then, that the contemporary boundaries paradox, possibly 
augmented by the democratic self-institution paradox, determines a reconsideration 
of the justification for extraterritorial voting rights? Democratic theory is, as 
suggested above, particularly sensitive to the internal procedural coherence of the 
answer to the democratic boundary problem14, being also seemingly unable to 
provide any obvious justificatory framework for criteria of inclusion and exclusion 
that does not reproduce the circularity (in either its binary or in its ternary form); 
and cannot also easily externalize the definition of democracy’s domain to other 
theories. Could there, accordingly, be a case that extending voting rights beyond the 
limits of political boundaries may address the underlying normative concern in a 
manner that is consistent with a democratic articulation of the basic intuitions? 
After all, voting and elections are an essential element of the contemporary (and 
modern) understandings of the meaning of democracy, having displaced the ancient 
defining features of democratic government – the unmediated presence of the whole 
people and selection by lot15.  
Two of the moral contexts that have received privileged scrutiny in recent 
studies on global justice refer to the circumstances of global poverty, and to the 
problem of policing the borders in face of migration. In the latter case, territorial 
demarcations through physical frontiers designate also the limits of the political 
membership – a significant and often overlooked overlap that equates demos with 
territory. In both cases, the relevant normative framework can be questioned as to 
its ultimate political consequences: are the individuals affected by decisions taken 
and by policies designed in other political communities, entitled to claim a right to 
vote – or be somehow represented in the democratic procedures of those countries? 
                                                        
13
  Arash Abizadeh, “On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary 
Problem”, American Political Science Review, vol. 106, no. 4, November 2012, p. 877. 
14
  Gustaf Arrhenius, “The Boundary Problem…cit.”; Ben Saunders, “Defining the Demos”, 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, vol. 11, no. 3, August 1, 2012, pp. 280-301. 
15
  Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
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Of course, to answer such claims, a long process of articulating the 
meaning of political representation (and its possible realization beyond voting 
rights) is manifestly due. The last part of this article will look into some particularly 
thought-provoking modes of re-thinking the problems of political representation in 
cosmopolitan settings. Similarly, any entitlements or claims to voting rights are to 
be judged on the basis of interpretations of national and transnational 
responsibility16, duties to others and corresponding rights17 – which are by no 
means uncontroversial issues; on the contrary, they are precisely the very gist of 
normative theorizing about global justice. The purpose of this article is not to 
account for the details of these debates, but rather to question a very specific line of 
reasoning, that establishes voting rights as the ultimate political outcomes of the 
normative considerations on, for instance, the nature of responsibilities for global 
poverty or the degree of coercion represented by the borders limiting migration. 
What types of extraterritorial rights can then be promoted, compatible with 
a cosmopolitan perspective (i.e., which do more than simply aim to recreate 
ethnically homogenous political communities)? Several recent studies elaborate on 
the conditions and terms for such voting rights18. Bauböck develops an account 
where multiple and evolving forms of citizenship are explained as contributing to 
an emerging idea of “transnational citizenship”. In recent years, he notes, an 
increasing number of countries have changed their internal legal systems and 
constitutional settings in order to accommodate or even encourage the possibility of 
individuals having dual or multiple citizenship. An additional phenomenon that 
further allows Bauböck to articulate the idea of transnational citizenship is 
represented by the similar multiplication of “denizenship”. Significant numbers of 
long-term residents in western countries have not (yet) acquired legal citizenship, 
but enjoy a quasi-citizenship status: they are holders of welfare rights and civil 
liberties, are paying taxes, and may even vote in certain (usually local) elections. 
What is missing from the denizens’ status is the right to vote in the major national 
                                                        
16
  David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford Political Theory, 
Oxford, 2007. 
17
  Thomas Pogge, “Priorities of Global Justice”, Metaphilosophy, vol. 32, no. 1-2, January 1, 
2001, pp. 6-24; Idem, Global Justice, Wiley, London, 2002; Thomas Pogge, World 
Poverty and Human Rights, Polity, London, 2008. 
18
  Rainer Bauböck, “Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A 
Normative Evaluation of External Voting”, Fordham Law Review, vol. 75, no. 5, January 
1, 2007, p. 2393; Christian List, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Can There Be a Global 
Demos? An Agency-Based Approach”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 38, no. 1, 2010, 
pp. 76-110; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Fuzzy Citizenship in Global Society”, Journal of 
Political Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 4, December 2012, pp. 456-480. 
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elections – but they are assumed to conserve their original citizenship status, with 
all the associated political rights.  
Koenig-Archibugi’s concept of “fuzzy citizenship” 19 is one that does more 
than build upon the ambiguities of denizenship. It is a normative proposition that 
aims to provide a solution from a cosmopolitan perspective to the problem of 
democracy’s domain. Fuzzy citizenship, while still based on the territorial 
configuration of present states, grants participatory rights to “all those who are 
likely to be causally affected by any possible decision under any possible agenda” 
(p. 2); such rights vary according to the intensity of affectedness; and the suggested 
institutionalization of such proposals is that “the legislature of each state should 
grant voting power to representatives elected by all non-residents in proportion to 
the share of world income under the control of that state.” (p. 3).  
The main thrust of these (normative or empirical) account is based on the 
all affected interests principle, several readings of which are spelled out in the next 
section. Several other accounts similarly deploy this principle to argue for or assess 
the potential new contours of political citizenship in view of the cosmopolitan 
condition20. Lack of space prevents an exhaustive review here of the recent 
literature on this fundamental topic. These new modes of articulating the notion of 
citizenship are promising – as they allow thinking of citizenship as a modular 
quality. In the last section I offer an interpretation of modular citizenship, yet an 
important note is here essential: 
The exclusive character of membership in a political community has thus 
been radically transformed and now both countries of immigration and countries of 
emigration routinely allow the migrating individuals to preserve their previous 
citizenship while acquiring a new citizenship. This is a phenomenon of a crucial 
importance as the multiplication of sites of political allegiances, political obligation 
and correlated notions of legitimacy, challenges and perhaps redefines the 
traditional elements of democratic theory articulated in the circumstances of, and 
grounded on the presupposition of, a singularity of political membership. The 
                                                        
19
  Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Fuzzy Citizenship in Global Society”, cit. 
20
  David Held and others, Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press, London, 1995; 
Daniele Archibugi, David Held, Martin Köhler, Re-Imagining Political Community: 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Stanford University Press, Redwood City, CA, 
1998; Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy: For and Against: Ethical Theory, 
Institutional Design and Social Struggles, Reissue edition, Routledge, London; New York, 
2008; Hans Agné, “Why Democracy Must Be Global: Self-Founding and Democratic 
Intervention”, International Theory, vol. 2, no. 3, November 2010, pp. 381-409; Paulina 
Ochoa Espejo, “People, Territory, and Legitimacy in Democratic States”, American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 58, no. 2, April 1, 2014, pp. 466-478. 
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uniqueness of political membership has a rather tragic dimension to it – and 
precisely because of this tragic dimension the burdens of public justification of 
political authority were raised so high in political liberalism and democratic 
theorizing. If individuals are conceived as born in a given political community and 
under the presupposition of a one-time exit option (definitive emigration), then the 
legitimacy concerns are quite considerable. If, on the other hand, their possible 
political memberships are multiple and even ambiguous, then the very notion of 
political legitimacy can be redefined accordingly.  
An oft-invoked line of argument for addressing the democratic boundary 
problem consists in trying to deploy a version of the all-affected interests’ principle. 
This principle, part of the core democratic intuitions itself, mandates that those 
whose relevant interests are affected by a decision should be included into the 
decision making process. It can take multiple forms and meanings according to 
what we may consider to be the “relevant” interests, what “affected” presupposes, 
and also what “inclusion” entails. The recent literature has explored the different 
connotations and implications of the principle – and more specifically of the first two 
terms: “relevant” and “affected”. After recapitulating some of the formulations that 
advanced the discussion, we turn to the third term whose meaning determines the 
overall relevance of the principle: “inclusion”. Supposing we agree on which 
decisions affect which interests and to what degree, the all affected interests 
principle then mandates inclusion. Does “inclusion” mean granting voting rights? 
Since such rights would be extended to individuals that are not members of (but 
affected by decisions taken by) the original demos, these would thus be 
extraterritorial voting rights.  
 
 
THE ALL AFFECTED INTERESTS’ PRINCIPLE, 
BORDERS, AND MIGRATION 
 
We see a particularly vivid discussion of the nature and implications of the 
all affected principle in the recent exchange between David Miller and Arash 
Abizadeh on the matter of frontiers and immigration21. According to Abizadeh, the 
                                                        
21
  Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion No Right to Unilaterally 
Control Your Own Borders”, Political Theory, vol. 36, no. 1, 2008, pp. 37-65; David 
Miller, “Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh”, 
Political Theory, vol. 38, no. 1, February 1, 2010, pp. 111-120; Arash Abizadeh, 
“Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller”, Political Theory, 
vol. 38, no. 1, February 1, 2010, pp. 121-130. 
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reach of the principle is such that it effectively contests a state’s traditional 
unilateral right to police its own borders: “According to democratic theory, the 
democratic justification for a regime of border control is ultimately owed to both 
members and nonmembers”22. The sequence of the argument is apparently simple:  
 
“First, a democratic theory of popular sovereignty requires that the coercive 
exercise of political power be democratically justified to all those over whom it is 
exercised, that is, justification is owed to all those subject to state coercion. Second, the 
regime of border control of a bounded political community subjects both members and 
nonmembers to the state’s coercive exercise of power. Therefore, the justification for a 
particular regime of border control is owed not just to those whom the boundary marks 
as members, but to nonmembers as well” (p. 45).  
 
The implications of this proposal have not remained without challenge: 
David Miller questions23 the conception of autonomy that pervades Abizadeh’s 
account of the nature of political coercion at the border. According to Miller, the 
very acts of border control are not inherently coercive, and hence cannot generate 
entitlements for democratic justification for nonmembers. The analytic distinction 
between coercion (“forcing a person to do some relatively specific thing”) and 
prevention (“forcing a person not to do some relatively specific thing while leaving 
other options open”) marks, for Miller, the appropriate moral and political context 
for thinking the limitations to personal autonomy posed by a state’s policing its own 
borders. Since borders (and states’ specific actions to maintain them) merely 
prevent potential migrant from crossing them, and typically do not coerce them to 
choose a unique course of action, the democratic entitlements emerging from such 
contexts are weak. 
David Miller, of course, has for a long time filtered the cosmopolitan 
commitments through a healthy dose of liberal nationalism. In an article assessing 
the nature of Dahl’s democratic paradox24, he lists a series of possible 
interpretations of the all affected interests principle. They are structured along the 
lines of competing conceptions of democracy – since, according to Miller, “answers 
to the domain question depend on the conception of democracy that is being 
invoked to resolve it” (p. 205). Liberal democrats understand democracy 
instrumentally, as conducive to the independently worthy values such as freedom 
and welfare. Radical democrats, on the other hand, see democracy as intrinsically 
valuable: a democratic process which allows everyone to have agency and be 
                                                        
22
  Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion…cit.”, p. 44. 
23
  David Miller, “Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive…cit.”. 
24
  Idem, “Democracy’s Domain”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 37, no. 3, 2009, pp. 201-228 
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empowered is valuable irrespective of the other values it may advance. In 
considering the potential extension of the boundaries of a demos when decisions 
“are likely to make a significant impact on people who are not currently entitled to 
participate” (p. 213), Miller lists two applicable principles:  
 
“The first is the affected interests principle: a democracy’s domain should 
extend to include all those whose interests will be affected by the decisions it takes. The 
second is the coercion principle: the domain should extend to include all those who will 
be coerced by its decisions. Since one can be affected by a decision, in the relevant 
sense, without being coerced by it, but not vice versa, the first principle is likely to 
extend the domain more widely than the second.”(p. 213-14) 
 
The quest is then for stipulating coercion proper, instead of more 
expansionary and inherently ambiguous notions such as affected interests, as 
legitimate criterion for deciding on democracy’s domain; if the latter is used, the 
results are problematic: the demos may “expand in all directions, depending on 
which possibilities are contemplated in the deliberation leading up to the decision” 
(p. 215); or, it may create an indeterminacy problem because of the binary or 
ternary circularity problems described above – when democracy’s scope (ever-
evolving content of decisions) is seen in mutual determination with democracy’s 
domain (ever-evolving membership).  
For Robert Goodin, there are also prima facie reasons to rely on the all 
affected interests principle to address the problem of democracy’s domain25. Yet 
articulating the possible interpretations thereof leads us again to some unsettling 
results. Thus, the principle can refer to the “All Actually Affected Interests” or to 
the “All Possibly Affected Interests”; and to “All and Only Affected Interests” or to 
“All Probably Affected Interests”; the latter two being further elaborations of the 
former pair of significations.  
 
 
INCLUSION AND VOTING RIGHTS: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL, 
VIRTUAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
 
We turn now to the third key term of the all affected interests principle: 
inclusion. The fundamental question here is whether inclusion calls for voting 
                                                        
25
  Robert Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests…cit.” 
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rights. Again, since we speak of the right to vote of non-members of a political 
community whose interests are affected by its decisions, the question is most often 
framed in terms of extraterritoriality. Of course, this is based on the assumption that 
voting rights are coextensive with territorial rights, which means that the default 
constituency for electoral processes is the territorially-defined constituency; and, 
also, that voting is the necessary, constitutive element of inclusion. I will look into 
both these assumptions in turn. 
 
 
Territorial Definitions of Political Constituency 
 
Part of the significance of the problem of democracy’s domain is precisely 
that it allows for a distinction between political and geographical borders of a 
demos. Political borders are those that are defined by the (exclusionary) criteria of 
citizenship. Territorial borders are rather physical demarcations or obstacles to entry 
(or exit) meant to control access within a given jurisdiction. Sometimes, the two 
meanings are compounded, as when questions of political membership are 
translated into questions of residence (and even persistent, continuous, proven 
residence as an element of the criteria for obtaining citizenship); but they are 
obviously logically distinct.  
One tacit but profound way in which geographical determination and 
political membership are compounded is when assuming that the default, standard 
form that a political constituency can take is precisely a territorially defined one. In 
a volume focused on the nature and significance of political representation, Andrew 
Rehfeld sets out to question this default expectation: the territorial definition of 
electoral constituencies is among the democratic institutions and practices that 
“have become so familiar that we risk treating them as somehow natural and 
therefore ‘obviously’ preferable to those we have yet to consider”26.  
The importance of this territorial understanding of electoral constituencies 
in contemporary democracies has a profound impact on the ways on which we 
conceive and realize the normative expectations of our democratic intuitions. The 
reconsideration of the contours of territorial electoral constituencies determines 
directly the result of elections, referenda and establishes the political domination of 
partisan, ethnic or religious majorities. Therefore, treating them as “natural” is a 
common yet problematic attitude. Fundamentally, the very meaning of majority and 
minority is given by the territorial limits of the constituency within which the 
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  Andrew Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. xi. 
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decisions are voted upon. A particular majority in a specific territorial configuration 
may be transformed into a systematic or structural minority in another configuration 
of such given constituency. Gerrymandering is a tumultuously criticized practice 
precisely because it exposes the ultimate potential arbitrariness of the process of 
drawing and re-drawing electoral constituency demarcations – hence the potential 
arbitrariness of the majority rule settings, otherwise an essential democratic 
decision making procedure. Calls for ending gerrymandering are not only heard in 
the US Congress and think tanks, but also in those multiethnic societies where the 
local proportions among different ethnicities may ensure either the conditions for 
self-government, even self-determination or, by the reconfiguration of electoral lines, of 
fragmentation, dispersion, and acculturation. 
Moreover, the shifting shape of electoral constituencies determines a 
crucial aspect of the democratic mode of government: not only can it transform 
majorities into minorities and vice versa, but even more fundamentally, it may 
determine who is in and who is out of the constituency. To extrapolate the 
discussion at a national level, it is the case that the configuration of present borders 
(the larger scale contours of the national constituency) may be the result of similarly 
arbitrary relations of power and force. Drawing and redrawing boundaries – 
especially, but not limited to the post-colonial transformations – results in the 
famously arbitrary “straight lines” of borders in Africa, Asia or North-America. 
Such straight lines epitomize the randomness and arbitrariness of certain borders, 
which even decades after being drawn are unable to produce correspondingly 
separate political realities.  
Such and other kind of borders are obviously leaving parts of the same 
communities out of each other’s political institutions; their existence does not 
nullify the shared fate of individuals across and beyond the borders; and the 
ultimate authority of territorial criteria for demarcation of political communities is 
increasingly challenged.  
The point here is not that territorial constituencies are anomalies of 
democratic practice. Rather, it is that they should not be considered as “normal”, 
hence in no need of justification. The justificatory burden is not exclusively on the 
claims for extraterritorial voting rights, as the very territorial definition is in more 
than one way disconcerting. In actual fact, “extraterritorial” can mean both “beyond 
a specific territory” and “without relation to any territory”. Most accounts build on 
the first understanding and look for extending the initial territorial configuration that 
is deemed too restrictive. Yet on the second reading of the meaning of “extraterritoriality” 
the very primacy (or prima facie role) of the territory is under scrutiny. 
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Inclusion, Voting and Virtual Representation 
 
The last issue to consider is whether voting is the obligatory element of 
political inclusion – as mandated by the all affected interests principle. The act of 
voting was itself deemed to be a core element in any understanding of modern 
representative government, and later democracy27. This electoral/elective dimension 
was replacing selection by lot in ancient democracy in order to become the staple 
democratic act. Moreover, political representation (and voting as its privileged 
mode) is inclusion28. 
My contention is that the corollary of the problems raised when discussing 
the possible interpretations of the all affected interests principle is that citizenship 
and inclusion should rather be thought of as modular. Modular citizenship and 
modular inclusion are compatible with both elective and non-elective dimensions of 
representative democracy – the latter being theorized as ‘virtual representation’ by 
Edmund Burke29. For Burke,  
 
”Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests, and 
a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any 
description of people, and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are 
not actually chosen by them. This is virtual representation. Such a representation I think 
to be, in many cases, even better than the actual. It possesses most of its advantages, 
and is free from many of its inconveniences”30. 
 
Virtual representation, also theorized by Hanna Pitkin31, defined as 
“surrogate representation” by Jane Mansbridge32 and further explored by Saward33 
                                                        
27
  Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government., cit. 
28
  David Plotke, “Representation Is Democracy”, Constellations, vol. 4, no. 1, 1997, pp. 19-34. 
29
  Edmund Burke, Hercules Langrishe, A Letter from the Right Hon. Edmund Burke ... to Sir 
Hercules Langrishe, on the Subject of Roman Catholics of Ireland and the Propriety of 
Admitting Them to the Elective Franchise, Consistently with the Principles of the 
Constitution as Established at the Revolution [microform], Goldsmiths’-Kress Library of 
Economic Literature ; No. 15432, Printed for J. Debrett, London, 1792. 
30
  Edmund Burke, The Works of ... Edmund Burke, F. & C. Rivington, 1803, p. 360. 
31
  Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, 
Oakland, CA, 1967. 
32
  Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation”, American Political Science Review, vol. 97, 
no. 4, 2003, pp. 515-528. 
33
  Michael Saward, “Authorisation and Authenticity: Representation and the Unelected”, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2009, pp. 1-22; Michael Saward, 
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and Pârvu34, may offer significant avenues for rethinking the inclusionary potential 
of modular citizenship. As a de-territorialized form of political representation, it 
eschews the limits and potential arbitrariness of territorial constituency; 
furthermore, it can be rendered compatible with strong readings of normative 
procedural legitimacy in deliberative democracy by adopting criteria similar to 
those proposed by Robert Goodin in his paper on “Democratic Deliberation 
Within”35: his emphasis is on each participating individual, not simply on the 
representatives. And “deliberation within” means “less a matter of making people 
‘conversationally present’ and more a matter of making them ‘imaginatively 
present’ in the minds of deliberators” (p. 83). 
Virtual representation, deliberation within, or modular citizenship are 
related concepts permeated by purposes of including those that find themselves in a 
relevant normative circumstance of democratic concern – yet are not extended, for 
reasons pertaining to the ambiguities of the all affected interests principle, formal, 
extraterritorial voting rights.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The normative challenges of the various solutions put forth in order to 
address the boundary problem illustrate the limits of political inclusion when 
articulated as an application of the all affected interests principle. Modular (or 
“fuzzy”) conceptions citizenship and virtual representation, when corroborated with 
deliberative standards that encourage “making others imaginatively present”, allow 
for extraterritorial democratic processes that could, if properly expounded, 
contribute to generate significant opportunities to rethink the range of entitlements, 
duties and responsibilities involved in the current debates on international 
development. 
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Burkean Notion’s Contemporary Relevance”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science 
Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 2010, pp. 9-25. 
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  R.E. Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 29, no. 
1, 2005, pp. 81-109. 
